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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-PUBLIC HAS RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen (1984)
Historically, under the common law, the public has enjoyed a right
of access to the judicial process.' Whether the Constitution protects
public access to judicial proceedings has been less clear.2 Although the
Constitution guarantees the criminally accused a right to a public trial, it
does not expressly guarantee the public a right of access to criminal tri-
als. 3 Despite the absence of an express constitutional public right of
access, however, in 1980 the Supreme Court decided that even at the
unopposed request of a criminal defendant, a criminal trial may not be
closed to the public unless the trial court articulates an overriding inter-
est to justify the closure. 4 The Court's decision was based on its finding
1. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73, 580 n.17
(1980) (plurality opinion); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 418-33
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Open criminal and civil trials are longstanding features of the English judi-
cial system. E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 91 (1st ed. 1929). As early as
1267, the Statute of Marlboro required open proceedings " 'for all Causes ought
to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the King's Courts
openly in the King's Courts, whither all persons may resort.' " Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 565 n.6 (quoting 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
103 (6th ed. 1681) (emphasis added by the Court). Early American colonists
brought with them the English presumption of open trials. Id. at 567. For ex-
ample, the "Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 . . . provided '[tihat all
Courts shall be open.' " Id. at 568 (quoting LAWS AGREED UPON IN ENGLAND,
cited in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 140
(1971) and cited in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 217 (R. Perry ed. 1959)).
2. For a discussion of the Court's decision that the Constitution does pro-
tect the public's right of access to criminal trials, see infra notes 3-7 and accom-
panying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial .... " Id. The Supreme Court has held that the right to a public
trial is a personal right of the accused which does not guarantee the public a
right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979). Although the Gannett Court addressed the narrow
issue of access to a pretrial suppression hearing, the Court spoke in terms of
public trials, generally, and made clear that the sixth amendment does not guar-
antee to the press and public a right of access to criminal trials. See id. at 379-80.
4. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (plurality
opinion). In Richmond Newspapers, the defendant moved that his fourth trial for
the same murder be closed to the public to prevent the possibility of another
mistrial. Id. at 559-6 1. The prosecutor did not object, and the trial judge or-
dered closure, relying on a state statute giving the court discretionary power to
exclude persons whose presence might impair a fair trial. Id. at 560. Later in
the day, Richmond Newspapers unsuccessfully made a motion to vacate the
court's closure order. Id. at 560-61. The newspaper appealed, but the Virginia
(980)
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that the first 5 and fourteenth 6 amendments guarantee to the public and
press a right of access to criminal trials. 7 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the public's first amendment right of access to criminal trials in 1982
Supreme Court dismissed the newspaper's mandamus and prohibition petitions
and denied its petition for appeal. Id. at 562. The Supreme Court, after grant-
ing certiorari, held that the first and fourteenth amendments guarantee the pub-
lic and press a right of access to criminal trials unless there is an overriding
interest articulated in the findings. Id. at 580-81 (plurality opinion). See also id.
at 581-82 (White, J., concurring); id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in thejudgment); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun,J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court, however, did not
define the circumstances that would constitute such an overriding interest. Id. at
581 n.18 (plurality opinion). Because the trial court had made no findings to
support closure of the criminal trial, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the Virginia court had impermissibly closed the trial in violation of
the public's constitutional rights. Id. at 580-81 (plurality opinion); id. at 600-01
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id. The first amendment does not explicitly guarantee
to the public a right of access to criminal trials. See id. However, the first amend-
ment has been interpreted to imply other freedoms which it does not grant ex-
plicitly. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (first
amendment rights to speak and to publish imply a freedom to listen); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (first amendment right to publish implies
freedom to gather information).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in perti-
nent part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
§ 1. The fourteenth amendment has been interpreted to incorporate the first
amendment, making the latter applicable to the states. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion). In finding con-
stitutional support for the public's right of access to criminal trials, the Supreme
Court noted that the Bill of Rights was enacted at a time when trials had long
been presumptively open. Id. at 575 (plurality opinion). Therefore, the Court
reasoned that "[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend
trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees." Id. (plurality opinion).
The Court had already laid the groundwork for this guarantee by distinguishing
prior cases involving conflicts between public access and a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial on the basis that those cases were decided under the sixth
amendment, which gives rights to the accused, not to the public. Id. at 564 (cit-
ing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1979); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794
(1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965)). For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Richmond Newspa-
pers, see infra notes 69 & 72 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion
of the Richmond Newspapers case and of the first amendment right of access, see
O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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when it found unconstitutional a statute mandating the exclusion of the
press and public during the testimony of minor victims of specified sex-
ual offenses. 8 The Third Circuit extended this first amendment protec-
tion in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen.9 In Publicker Industries, the Third
Circuit held that the public has not only a common law' 0 but also a con-
stitutional11 right of access to civil proceedings.
The questions presented to the Third Circuit in Publicker Industries
arose from a proxy fight to determine control of a publicly traded corpo-
ration, Publicker Industries (Publicker).1 2 Publicker brought this action
against a participant in the proxy fight, David Cohen, seeking to enjoin
him from soliciting and voting proxies because of his misrepresentation
in failing to make material disclosures in connection with his planned
8. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-06 (1982).
In Globe Newspaper the Court recognized that the right of access to criminal trials
was protected by the first amendment but that it was not an absolute right. Id. at
606. The Court considered two state interests which were asserted to support
the mandatory closure statute: (1) protecting minor victims of sex crimes from
further psychological distress, and (2) encouraging such victims to come forward
to testify. Id. at 607. The Court found the second state interest speculative and
illogical, but found the first interest compelling. Id. at 607-10. The Court
stated, however, that even the compelling first interest did not justify mandatory
closure because the same interest could be served if the trial court determined
whether closure was necessary on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 607-08. Because
closure would not always be necessary to protect the victim, the Court found
that the mandatory closure statute was not narrowly tailored to protect the
state's compelling interest and, consequently, ruled the statute unconstitutional.
Id. at 609-11 & n.27. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Globe
Newspaper, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
9. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 1069. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's finding of a
common law right of access to civil proceedings, see infra notes 31-33 and ac-
companying text.
11. 733 F.2d at 1070. The Third Circuit held that the first and fourteenth
amendments guarantee the public a right of access to civil judicial proceedings.
Id. The Court stated that this right is not absolute, however, and that the trial
court may limit the public's right of access when an important countervailing
interest is demonstrated. Id. at 1070-7 1. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
finding of a constitutional right of access to civil proceedings, see infra notes 35-
46 and accompanying text.
12. 733 F.2d at 1061-62. Publicker is a corporation with approximately
6,000 shareholders. Id. The Neuman family, through individuals and various
estates, controlled 37% of the 8.3 million outstanding shares of Publicker stock.
Id. at 1062. The defendant, David Cohen, sought to gain control of the Pub-
licker board of directors through an agreement with certain members of the
Neuman family. Id. The agreement provided that the Neumans would give Co-
hen their proxies to be voted at the annual stockholder's meeting in exchange
for Cohen's promise to purchase a substantial number of their shares of Pub-
licker stock if he gained control of the board. Id. One member of the Neuman
family resisted this plan and successfully brought an action in the Delaware
County Court of Common Pleas to have the agreement set aside. Id. The court
held that the agreement was invalid because it violated a Pennsylvania statute
which prohibits a corporate stockholder from selling his voting rights or proxy.
Id. (citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1504 (Purdon 1983)).
982
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purchase of Publicker stock.13 Cohen, however, claimed that Publicker
should be required to postpone its December 8 shareholders' meeting
until it disclosed to its shareholders the fact that one of Publicker's sub-
sidiaries had failed to obtain a required approval for its production of
scotch whiskey, 14 which raised the possibility that its scotch was pro-
duced illegally and would have to be withdrawn from the market. 15
During the course of a December 7 hearing on motions filed by
both parties, 16 a Philadelphia Inquirer reporter appeared in the courtroom
13. 733 F.2d at 1062. In its complaint and motion for a temporary re-
straining order, Publicker contended that Cohen had made misrepresentations
and had failed to make material disclosures required in Schedules 13D and 14B,
which are required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules promul-
gated under that Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1984) (regulation regarding
filing of Schedule 13D); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 11 (1984) (regulation regarding
filing of Schedule 14B). See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 526, 577-78 (1983) (discussing requirements for filing and disclosure re-
garding schedules 13D and 14B).
Upon being informed of the common pleas court order which invalidated
Cohen's stock purchase agreement with the Neuman family, Publicker filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order in federal district court to prevent Co-
hen from soliciting and voting proxies for the December 8 shareholders' meet-
ing until he amended his filings with the SEC. 733 F.2d at 1062. The district
court held a conference to consider the motion for a temporary restraining or-
der on December 3, the day it was filed. Id. The district court issued the tempo-
rary restraining order and ordered another hearing to be held December 6. Id.
14. 733 F.2d at 1062, 1065. A question concerning this potentially harmful
information was first raised at the December 3 conference on Publicker's motion
for a temporary restraining order. Id. at 1062. The information in question
concerned the fact that one of Publicker's subsidiaries had failed to obtain the
required approval from the British government for the introduction of an en-
zyme into its production of scotch whiskey. Id. at 1065. The use of this enzyme
is common in the production of scotch whiskey and is permitted under the Eng-
lish Company Finance Act, provided that prior approval is obtained from Cus-
toms and Excise. Id. Publicker sought to prevent disclosure of its subsidiary's
unauthorized use of the enzyme until Customs and Excise determined whether
to approve this unauthorized use. Id. Cohen claimed that Publicker's failure to
disclose this information violated federal securities laws requiring material dis-
closures by participants in proxy contests. Id. at 1062. In denying this allega-
tion, Publicker asserted that disclosure on December 8 would be premature
because this information would not be material if Customs and Excise decided
to approve the unauthorized use. Id. Publicker also claimed that Cohen had
violated a confidentiality agreement with Publicker when he sought to use this
information to postpone the stockholders' meeting. Id.
15. Id. at 1065. Since Customs and Excise had not decided whether to ap-
prove Publicker's subsidiary's unauthorized use of the enzyme, the legality of the
subsidiary's scotch was in question. Id. Moreover, Publicker, through its board
chairman, claimed that because most scotch whiskeys are blends of scotches pro-
duced by many different distilleries, including Publicker's, the legal status of the
scotch industry as a whole was in doubt. Id.
16. Id. at 1062. The court addressed the following issues in considering the
parties' motions: (1) whether Cohen should be enjoined from soliciting and vot-
ing proxies at the December 8 shareholders' meeting because of his failure to
make material disclosures to the SEC, as required by federal statute; and
4
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of District Judge Joseph Lord. 17 Publicker immediately requested that
the hearing be closed to everyone except the parties, their counsel, and
witnesses because of the sensitive nature of the information that was be-
ing discussed. 18 Judge Lord complied with Publicker's request. 19 Later
during the hearing, attorneys representing both Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. (PNI)20 and Dow Jones & Company, Inc. (Dow Jones) 2 1 ap-
peared before Judge Lord and unsuccessfully urged him to open the
proceedings. 22 At the conclusion of the closed hearing, Judge Lord de-
nied Cohen's motion to enjoin the December 8 shareholders' meeting
and continued his order for confidentiality until he decided whether the
court should compel disclosure of the sensitive information. 2 3
On December 20, PNI filed a motion in the district court for imme-
(2) whether Publicker should be required to disclose the information about its
subsidiary's scotch at the scheduled shareholders' meeting. Id. at 1062-63.
17. Id. at 1063. The reporter was present in the courtroom when the court
reconvened after lunch. Id. The Third Circuit found the record unclear as to
whether anyone from the general public attended the morning session. Id.
18. Id. at 1063. The basis of Publicker's request was that the very purpose
of the hearing was to decide whether the information concerning Publicker's
subsidiary should be disclosed. Id. For a discussion of the information in ques-
tion, see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
19. 733 F.2d at 1063. Judge Lord explained:
It seems to me by permitting the press here now, that the press would
be usurping the very function that is reposed in me; namely, deciding
whether this information should be revealed or not. That is the very
issue of this case .... Here, if it is disclosed the press would be making
the decision before I made mine and it would make mine moot, and I
believe in protection of my own judicial functions in this case I have the
power to exclude the press and I will.
Id. (citing Joint Appendix at A117).
20. Id. at 1063. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (PNI) is the publisher of the
Philadelphia Inquirer. Id.
21. Id. DowJones & Company, Inc. (DowJones) is the publisher of the Wall
Street Journal. Id. Dow Jones' involvement in the controversy began when a re-
porter for the Wall Street Journal appeared in the courtroom after the closure of
the hearing. Id. Her request for a hearing with counsel for the publishers (PNI
and Dow Jones) present in order to ascertain why the hearing was closed was
denied. Id.
22. Id. In the alternative, counsel urged the court to open the nonconfiden-
tial parts of the hearings if it would not open the entire proceedings. Id. The
court rejected this request, stating that the entire hearing had been confidential.
Id. The court explained to counsel that its closure of the hearing was necessary
to protect the court's ability to determine the confidentiality issues before it. Id.
(quoting Joint Appendix at A 134-35). The following day, the Third Circuit de-
nied the publishers' petition for a writ of mandamus to compel reopening the
hearings. Id. at 1063.
23. Id. The district court. denied Cohen's motion on the ground that he
lacked standing because he had retained no interest in Publicker after the court
of common pleas invalidated his stock purchase agreement. Id. at 1063-64. For
a discussion of Cohen's stock purchase plans, see supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the sensitive information in question, see supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
984 [Vol. 30: p. 980
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diate access to the transcript of the December 7 closed hearing. 24 Pub-
licker responded with a motion to keep confidential the sensitive
information that it had revealed in its memorandum of law and at the
hearing.25 On January 6, 1983, the district court granted Publicker's
motion for confidentiality and directed Publicker to deliver to PNI and
DowJones only the nonconfidential portions of the hearing transcript. 26
PNI and Dow Jones appealed to the Third Circuit, on both common law
and first amendment grounds, from the district court's orders closing
the hearing and sealing the transcript. 27 While the publishers' appeal
was pending, Publicker moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds of
mootness because confidentiality was no longer required.28
The Third Circuit, with Judge Higginbotham writing for a unani-
mous panel,2 9 rejected Publicker's mootness contention as a preliminary
matter3 0 and went on to address the merits of the case. The court stated
24. 733 F.2d at 1064. Dow Jones joined in PNI's motion the next day. Id.
25. Id. In opposition to the publishers' motion for immediate access to the
hearing transcript, Publicker filed a memorandum of law which included a list of
the nonconfidential portions of the transcript. Id. Publicker admitted that most
of the transcript contained no confidential information, but despite the fact that
Publicker had not sought to close the morning session, it claimed that portions
of both the morning and afternoon transcripts should be kept confidential. Id.
For a discussion of Publicker's requests for closure, see supra notes 17-22 and
accompanying text.
26. 733 F.2d at 1064. Thus, the confidential information in the transcript
remained under seal, and counsel for PNI and Dow Jones were ordered not to
disclose to their clients the sensitive information which Publicker had disclosed
in its memorandum of law. Id. The district court did not issue an opinion ex-
plaining this order. Id.
27. Id. PNI and DowJones claimed that the district court's December 7 or-
der closing the hearing and January 6 order sealing the confidential portions of
the transcript deprived them of their common law and first amendment rights of
access to a civil trial and trial transcript without due process of law. Id.
28. Id. Publicker's motion was filed on November 17, 1983, more than two
months after oral argument before the Third Circuit. Id. Publicker alleged in its
motion that confidentiality was no longer necessary because Publicker had re-
ceived the required approval for its subsidiary's use of the enzyme. Id. at 1064-
65. Moreover, Publicker contended that it had already notified its stockholders
of the sensitive information pursuant to a November 17, 1983 court order in a
separate action, thereby making the instant appeal unnecessary. Id. at 1065 (cit-
ing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Clifford B. Cohn, No. 83-1357, (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17,
1983)).
29. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Weis, Higginbotham, and
Sloviter.
30. 733 F.2d at 1065-66. Publicker asserted that because it was the only
party that requested confidentiality and because it no longer opposed the re-
lease of the information, there was no justiciable case or controversy before the
court. Id. at 1065. Addressing this preliminary issue, the Third Circuit applied
the test for moomess which the Supreme Court enunciated in Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. ICC. Id. Under the Southern Pacific test, a case is not moot if the
dispute is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. (quoting Southern Pa-
cific, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). This test includes two conditions: (1) the chal-
lenged action must be of such short duration that the litigation process cannot
be completed while the dispute is still alive; and (2) there must be a reasonable
6
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that under the common law the public and press have an indisputable
right of access to judicial proceedings and judicial records.3 1 Acknowl-
edging that the Supreme Court usually had considered the common law
right of access to judicial proceedings and records only in connection
with criminal trials, 32 the Third Circuit examined the authority on which
the Supreme Court had relied in those cases and held that the common
law right of access extended to civil trials.3 3 Recognizing the "impor-
possibility that the complaining party will again be subjected to the same action.
Id. at 1065 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 (1979) (further
citation omitted)). Addressing the first condition, the Third Circuit observed
that the Supreme Court had recognized that criminal trials are generally of such
short duration that closure orders in such trials usually " 'will evade review.' "
Id. at 1066 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563
(1980) (further citation omitted)). The Third Circuit reasoned that because
hearings on the question of evidentiary confidentiality are of even shorter dura-
tion than criminal trials, closure orders in such hearings also will evade review.
Id. As to the second condition, the Third Circuit reasoned that the exclusion of
the press was reasonably certain to recur, and, therefore, it was likely that
"newspaper publishers such as PNI and Dow Jones 'will be subject to similar
closure orders entered by the district courts ...... Id. (quoting United States v.
Criden (Criden I), 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982), noted in the Third Circuit
Review, 28 VILL. L. REv. 723 (1983)). Therefore, with both conditions of the
test satisfied, the court denied Publicker's motion to dismiss the publishers' ap-
peal because of mootness. Id.
31. 733 F.2d at 1066 (citing United States v. Criden (Criden 1), 648 F.2d
814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)). In Criden I, television networks appealed from a dis-
trict court order denying their application to copy for broadcast purposes video
and audio tapes which were played to the jury during the criminal trial of two
Philadelphia city council members. 648 F.2d at 815-17. The Third Circuit re-
versed and remanded, concluding that
the trial court accorded too little weight to the strong common law pre-
sumption of access and to the educational and informational benefit
which the public would derive from broadcast of evidence introduced
at a trial which raised significant issues of public interest .... [W]e
believe that the application of the broadcasters should be granted, ex-
cept for that material which the district court explicitly determines to be
impermissibly injurious to third parties.
Id. at 829. In Criden I, the Third Circuit based part of its reasoning on Chief
Justice Burger's discussion of the history of open criminal trials in Richmond
Newspapers. Id. at 820-21 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 565-73
(1980)). Although the Richmond Newspapers decision was based on both common
law and first amendment grounds, the Criden I court decided the case only on
common law grounds. 648 F.2d at 820. For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers,
see supra note 4, and accompanying text.
32. 733 F.2d at 1066 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) (murder trial); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (pre-
trial suppression hearing in murder prosecution); Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (criminal conspiracy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (criminal contempt proceedings)).
33. Id. at 1066-67 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386
n. 15 (1979)). The Third Circuit based its common law holding on the Supreme
Court's review of the historical evidence presented in Gannett and on the Court's
assessment that the long history of open judicial proceedings was not restricted
to criminal cases. Id. The Gannett Court stated that
[i]f the existence of a common-law rule were the test for whether there
986
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tance in guaranteeing [the] freedoms at issue," however, the court de-
cided not to rest its decision on the common law right of access and
went on to reach the constitutional issues.3 4
The Third Circuit began its constitutional analysis by reviewing the
Supreme Court's decisions in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia3 5 and Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court36 to determine whether analogous reasoning
would justify extending the first amendment protection to guarantee the
public a right of access to civil proceedings.3 7 In its examination of
these decisions, the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court's rea-
soning rested on two features of the criminal justice system: (1) an his-
torical presumption of openness, 3 8 and (2) the significant role of the
public's right of access in guarding the integrity and fairness of the judi-
cial process. 39 The Third Circuit concluded that the same features of
the criminal justice system were characteristic of the civil justice sys-
tem. 40 As a basis for this conclusion, the court first found that the his-
torical evidence revealed that civil proceedings had been presumptively
open to the public, both in England and America. 4 1 Second, the court
is a Sixth Amendment public right to a public trial, ... there would be
such a right in civil as well as criminal cases .... In short, there is no
principled basis upon which a public right of access to judicial proceed-
ings can be limited to criminal cases if the scope of the right is defined
by the common law rather than the text and structure of the
Constitution.
443 U.S. at 386 n.15.
34. 733 F.2d at 1067. For a discussion of the propriety of the courts' avoid-
ance of constitutional issues, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
35. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
36. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). For a discussion of Globe Newspaper, see supra note
8 and accompanying text.
37. 733 F.2d at 1067-74. The Third Circuit recognized that these Supreme
Court decisions guaranteed the public a right of access only to criminal trials.
Id. at 1067-68 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17) (plurality
opinion) ("[w]hether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a ques-
tion not raised by this case"); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's deci-
sion today ... carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials").
38. 733 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605). In Globe
Newspaper, the Court explained that the historical presumption of openness was
important "not only 'because the Constitution carries the gloss of history,' but
also because 'a tradition of accessibility implies a favorable judgment of exper-
iences.' " 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment)).
39. 733 F.2d at 1068. The Third Circuit observed that in Globe Newspaper
the Court emphasized that public access to criminal trials "enhances the quality
and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process . . . [a]nd . . . permits the
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process." Id.
(quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606) (footnotes omitted by the court).
40. Id. at 1070.
41. Id. at 1068-70. The Third Circuit noted Sir Edward Coke's declaration
that the Statute of Marlboro of 1267 required open judicial proceedings. Id. at
1068 (quoting 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed.
8
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reasoned that both the public and the judicial system benefited from the
public's presence at civil trials. 4 2 Therefore, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that because the civil and criminal justice systems share these
features, the first amendment protects the public's right of access to civil
as well as to criminal proceedings. 43
Explaining its holding, the Third Circuit stated that although the
public's right of access to civil proceedings is not absolute, 44 "neverthe-
less it is to be accorded the due process protection that other fundamen-
tal rights enjoy."' 45 The court concluded that given such protection, the
public's right of access to civil trials may be denied only if such a denial
"serves an important governmental interest" and if "there is no less re-
strictive way to serve that governmental interest." '4 6
In clarifying this protection, the Third Circuit specified that a party
seeking closure must meet the burden of proving that there is good
1681)). The Third Circuit cited Sir Matthew Hale, Williams Blackstone, and
Professor John Henry Wigmore for the proposition that one reason for open
trials, both civil and criminal, is to encourage truthful testimony. Id. at 1068-70
(citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373 (W. Lewis ed. 1898); M. HALE,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 163 (C. Gray ed. 1971); 6J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 435 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
42. Id. at 1069-70. In part, the Third Circuit relied on Oliver Wendell
Holmes' statement that
[i]t is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place under the
public eye.., not because the controversies of one citizen with another
are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that
those who administer justice should always act under the sense of pub-
lic responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.
Id. at 1069 (quoting Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884)). The court
also looked to Professor Wigmore as authority for the proposition that public
access to judicial trials benefits the public in two ways: (1) by ensuring that of-
ficers of the court perform conscientiously, and (2) by increasing public knowl-
edge and respect for the judicial system and judicial remedies. Id. at 1069-70
(citing 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976)).
43. Id. at 1070.
44. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion) (further citations omitted)).
45. Id. at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07 (further citations
omitted)). In articulating the standard of review for limitation of the public's
right of access to a criminal proceeding, the Globe Newspaper Court stated that
"[w]here... the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." 457 U.S. at 606-07 (emphasis added).
46. 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07) (further
citation omitted)). Although the Third Circuit required an important govern-
ment interest, rather than a compelling one, it is submitted that the Third Cir-
cuit's standard of review is the same as the Globe Newspaper standard because
both require the least restrictive means. For a discussion of the Globe Newspaper
standard, see supra note 45 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of
Globe Newspaper, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30: p. 980
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cause for the court to provide such protection. 4 7 The court then speci-
fied the procedural and substantive requirements that a trial court must
satisfy before it can deny the public's right of access to civil proceedings:
procedurally, the court must articulate the countervailing interest it
seeks to protect with sufficient specificity to permit judicial review; 48
substantively, the court must demonstrate "an overriding interest based
on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest."
4 9
47. 733 F.2d at 1070-71. Judge Higginbotham explained that the party
seeking closure of a hearing or sealing of a transcript bears the burden of show-
ing that the material in question is the kind of information that courts will pro-
tect and that good cause exists for the closure order. Id. (citing Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
Good cause, according to the court, is established by a showing that a "clearly
defined and serious" injury will result from disclosure. Id. at 1070 (citing Zenith
Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 891). For a discussion of the kind of interests the
court will protect, see infra notes 49 & 60 and accompanying text.
48. 733 F.2d at 1071 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.
Ct. 819, 824 (1984) (demanding more specificity than the assertion of the de-
fendant's general right to a fair trial or the prospective jurors' rights to privacy
to justify closure of extensive voir dire proceedings); In re Iowa Freedom of In-
formation Council, 724 F.2d 658, 663-64 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding sufficient spec-
ificity to justify sealing portions of transcript in testimony that manufacturer's
property rights in trade secrets would be damaged by disclosure of marketing
and distribution plans contained in exhibits)).
49. Id. at 1073 (quoting United States v. Criden (Criden 1), 648 F.2d 814,
824 (3d Cir. 1981)). The court explained that the overriding interest required
for closure can involve "the content of the information at issue, the relationship
of the parties, or the nature of the controversy." Id. More specifically, the court
explained that safeguarding the contents of a trade secret or the existence of an
attorney-client relationship could be the basis of finding an overriding interest.
Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866,
890 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (trade secret); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (attorney-client relationship)). The court also
explained that an overriding interest could be established where disclosure of
the nature of the controversy would deprive a party of his right to enforce a
contractual obligation not to disclose specific information. Id. at 1073-74.
Unless there is such an overriding interest, the Third Circuit stated that
there is a presumption that civil proceedings will be open. Id. at 1073 (citing
Criden 1, 648 F.2d at 824). The court indicated that, where a party seeks closure,
the trial court may consider the allegedly confidential matter in camera and,
later, make the transcript available to the public if the countervailing interests
are deemed insufficient to overcome the presumption of openness. Id. at 1072.
The court emphasized, however, that the availability of the transcript is not an
"adequate substitute" for a public presence at the trial. Id. (quoting In re Iowa
Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1983)). There-
fore, the court warned that in deciding whether to conduct a proceeding in cam-
era, the trial court cannot relax the standards necessary to close proceedings
simply because the transcript can be made available later. Id. at 1072. Finally,
the Third Circuit advised that if a trial court finds an overriding interest which
requires confidentiality, it may close a hearing or seal a transcript as long as the
court uses the least restrictive means of maintaining the required confidentiality.
Id. at 1071 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824
(1984)).
10
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The Third Circuit proceeded to examine the record in this case to
determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion by closing
the December 7 hearing and sealing portions of the transcript. 50 First,
the court addressed the procedural requirements. 5' Regarding Cohen's
motion to force Publicker to disclose its "sensitive" information, the
court stated that the district court had adequately articulated the coun-
tervailing interest it sought to protect by closing the hearing. 52 Regard-
ing Publicker's motion to enjoin Cohen from soliciting and voting
proxies, however, the Third Circuit found that the district court had
abused its discretion by failing to articulate any countervailing interest
that would be protected by the closure. 53 Further, the Third Circuit
found that the district court failed to meet the procedural requirements
when it ordered the confidential portions of the transcript to be sealed
without articulating any countervailing interest to explain its order.5 4
Finally, the appellate court addressed the question of whether the
trial court had met the substantive requirements for denying the public's
right of access to the hearing and the transcript. 5 5 The Third Circuit
stated that the district court had not met the substantive requirements
50. Id. at 1071. For a discussion of the issues before the court at this hear-
ing, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of the procedural requirements, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
52. 733 F.2d at 1071. The Third Circuit found that the district court had
clearly articulated the countervailing interest when it stated that "[i]f I were to
permit the newspapers in here you would be usurping my function in deciding
the case before I did by revealing the information, even though I [might] ulti-
mately decide that it shouldn't be revealed." Id. at 1071 (quoting Joint Appen-
dix at A134-35). For a further discussion of the district court's explanation for
denying public access to the hearing, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. 733 F.2d at 1072.
54. Id. at 1072-73. Because of the lack of a record on the question, the
Third Circuit was forced to "indulge in speculation" to determine the reasons
behind the district court's decision. Id. at 1072. The Third Circuit suggested
that the district court may have ordered portions of the transcripts sealed in
order to preserve its ability to decide the issue of confidentiality. Id. at 1073.
The appellate court intimated that if the district court had not yet decided the
issue of confidentiality before issuing the order to seal the transcript, then the
order would have been proper "as [a] mechanism[] with which to buttress the
district court's attempt to preserve secrecy while it deliberated on the question
of confidentiality." Id. Alternatively, the Third Circuit hypothesized that the or-
der sealing portions of the transcript may have constituted the district court's
decision on the merits of the confidentiality question. Id. If that hypothesis was
true, the Third Circuit stated, then the district court could no longer rely on the
previously stated rationale of preserving its ability to determine the issue of con-
fidentiality as a reason for sealing the transcript. Id. The Third Circuit ex-
plained that under the first rationale the sealing order would have been valid,
whereas under the second hypothesis the order would have been invalid. Id.
Since the appellate court was left to speculate on the district court's rationale,
the Third Circuit concluded that the procedural requirement was not met. Id.
(quoting United States v. Criden (Criden 1), 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)).
55. Id. at 1073-74. For a discussion of the substantive requirements for
limiting the public's right of access, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
990 [Vol. 30: p. 980
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because it (1) failed to demonstrate any overriding interest that required
denying public access to the hearing on Publicker's motion,5 6 (2) failed
to restrict the closed portion of the hearing as narrowly as possible,
57
and (3) failed to show that sealing the transcript was essential to protect
Publicker's interest and was the least restrictive means of keeping the
information confidential. 5 8 The Third Circuit indicated that the "sensi-
tive" information in this case 5 9 was not the kind of commercial informa-
tion that the courts have traditionally protected 60 and that, in the
absence of other considerations, 6 1 courts should not deny the public's
56. 733 F.2d at 1074. The Third Circuit had already found that the district
court failed to meet even the procedural requirement of articulating an interest
which it sought to protect in closing the hearing on Publicker's motion. See supra
note 53 and accompanying text. Moreover, the appellate court indicated that it
could not think of any interest that would justify closure of the hearing on Pub-
licker's motion. 733 F.2d at 1074. The Third Circuit intimated that the district
court should have indicated why it did not consider a less restrictive alternative
to closure of the hearing on Cohen's and Publicker's motions, such as a bifur-
cated hearing. Id. Since neither the procedural nor the substantive require-
ments were met with regard to the closure of the hearing on Publicker's motion,
the Third Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
the public from this aspect of the hearing. Id. For a discussion of the issues
raised in Publicker's motion and the circumstances of the hearing on this mo-
tion, see supra notes 11-12 & 15 and accompanying text.
57. 733 F.2d at 1074. The court stated that the district court's closure of
the hearing on both Cohen's and Publicker's motions extended too far because
confidentiality was a concern only with regard to Cohen's motion. Id. Because
the district court heard both motions in the same closed session, the appellate
court concluded that the "hearing was not 'narrowly tailored' " to serve the in-
terest in confidentiality which the court articulated regarding Cohen's motion.
Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984)).
The Third Circuit implied that a bifurcated hearing would have been acceptable
as a less restrictive alternative to closure on Publicker's motion. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the issues before the court at the closed hearing, see supra notes 13-14
& 16 and accompanying text.
58. 733 F.2d at 1074. The Third Circuit noted that since the district court
had failed to articulate any countervailing interest it sought to protect in sealing
the transcript, it was not necessary for the appellate court to reach the question
of substantive requirements. Id. Nevertheless, the court addressed the substan-
tive requirements. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the sensitive information in question, see supra notes
14-15 and accompanying text.
60. 733 F.2d at 1074 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 n.42 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). Historically, the courts have
protected a variety of interests, including children's testimony involving decency
or morality, secret trade processes, and testimony which would threaten national
safety. See E. JENKS, supra note 1, at 92. More recently, courts have protected a
wider range of business interests. See, e.g., Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs.,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977) (cus-
tomer list); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (finan-
cial records detailing capitalization, net worth, and annual income); Maritime
Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(license fees and oral contracts with customers). For a further discussion of the
interests which courts have protected, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. 733 F.2d at 1074. The court stated that an enforceable confidentiality
12
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access to trial evidence concerning a company's poor management
practices.62
In analyzing the Publicker Industries opinion, it is submitted that the
Third Circuit took a bold step in extending first amendment protection
to the public's right of access to civil proceedings. 63 Although the
Supreme Court had foreshadowed the extension of this protection to
civil as well as criminal proceedings, 64 it is submitted that common law
agreement constitutes the type of "other consideration" that would justify deny-
ing the public's right of access to trial evidence. Id.
62. Id. The court stated that "[t]he presumption of openness plus the policy
interest in protecting unsuspecting people from investing in Publicker in light of
its bad business practices are not overcome by the proprietary interest of pres-
ent stockholders in not losing stock value or the interest of upper-level manage-
ment in escaping embarrassment." Id.
In conclusion, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the trial judge has a
difficult task when making closure decisions because of the time pressures of a
trial court. Id. Further, the court recognized that in this case it had not only the
advantage of time to review the closure decision but also the benefit of guidance
from the Supreme Court which was unavailable when the district court ruled on
the confidentiality issues. Id. Apparently, the Third Circuit was referring to the
guidance it received regarding the procedural and substantive requirements of
closure from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984).
Because of the additional guidance available to the appellate court from the
Press-Enterprise opinion, the Third Circuit stated that "we regard this opinion as
announcing what we believe the law to be rather than a critique on the trial
judge's performance." Id. at 1075. For a discussion of the procedural and sub-
stantive requirements which were defined in Press-Enterprise, see supra notes 49-
50 and accompanying text.
63. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding that the first amendment
protects the public's right of access to civil proceedings, see supra notes 35-43
and accompanying text.
64. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion)
("[w]hether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not
raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have
been presumptively open"); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the First and
Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to
trials themselves, civil as well as criminal").
Moreover, commentators had predicted that the courts would extend the
public's first amendment right of access to civil trials. See, e.g., Fenner & Koley,
Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 415, 430 (1981) ("Richmond Newspapers supports the conclusion that
the right of access surely applies to civil trials"); Note, The First Amendment Right
of Access to Government-Held Information: A Re-Evaluation After Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292, 328 (1982) ("[a]lthough Rich-
mond's express holding finds only a first amendment right to attend criminal
trials, there is no apparent obstacle to extending first amendment access rights
to civil trials as well"); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-The Public and
Press Have a Right of Access to Criminal Trials Absent an Overriding Interest Articulated in
Findings, 26 VILL. L. REv. 183, 202 (1980) ("Whether the right of the public to
attend trials identified in [Richmond Newspapers] ...applies to civil, as well as
criminal, trials is left unanswered .... [But i]n all probability it does.").
Publicker Industries was not the first extension of Richmond Newspapers beyond
the limited context of criminal trials. See, e.g., In re Iowa Freedom of Information
Council, 724 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1983) (extending to the public a first amend-
ment right of access to proceedings for contempt, a hybrid containing both civil
992
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grounds were sufficient to decide Publicker Industries.65 In both Richmond
Newspapers66 and Globe Newspaper,6 7 a state statute had been challenged
as unconstitutional, 68 making it necessary for the Supreme Court to
reach the first amendment issue. 69 In contrast, nothing in Publicker In-
dustries made it necessary for the Court to reach the constitutional
issue. 7
0
and criminal characteristics); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir.
1983) (guaranteeing the public a first amendment right of access to civil trials
which pertain to the release or incarceration of prisoners and to the conditions
of their confinement); United States v. Criden (Criden I/), 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir.
1982) (guaranteeing the public a first amendment right of access to pretrial sup-
pression, due process, and entrapment hearings in criminal prosecution); In re
United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980) (guar-
anteeing the public a right of access to criminal voir dire proceedings); United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (recognizing a first amendment
right of access to pretrial detention hearings), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
But see Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying
a first amendment right of access to pretrial deposition transcripts not used at
trial); In re San Juan Star, 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981) (denying a first amend-
ment right of access to information obtained in discovery).
65. For a discussion of the court's holding that the publishers had a com-
mon law right of access to civil trials, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying
text.
66. For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra notes 4 & 7 and ac-
companying text.
67. For a discussion of Globe Newspapers, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
68. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603-06 (challenge to state statute mandat-
ing exclusion of press and public during testimony of minor victims of sexual
offenses); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560 (challenge to state statute grant-
ing court discretionary power to exclude persons from trial).
69. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("our authority to reverse a decision by the highest court of the State is limited
to only those occasions when the state decision violates some provision of the
United States Constitution").
In cases like Publicker Industries, where nonconstitutional grounds are avail-
able to decide a case, the federal courts have traditionally sought to avoid consti-
tutional issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[t]he Court [has] developed ... a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitu-
tional questions pressed upon it for decision"). The Supreme Court has ex-
plained its policy of avoiding the adjudication of constitutional questions by
stating that this policy has
involved a continuous choice between the obvious advantages it pro-
duces for the functioning of government in all its coordinate parts and
the very real disadvantages, for the assurance of rights, which deferring
decision very often entails. On the other hand it is not altogether spec-
ulative that a contrary policy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or
greater harm for the security of private rights, without attaining any of
the benefits of tolerance and harmony for the functioning of the various
authorities in our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract deci-
sion, which such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their
part too in rendering rights uncertain and insecure.
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571-72 (1947).
70. 733 F.2d at 1067. The Third Circuit acknowledged that Publicker Indus-
14
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Nevertheless, after deciding that the public's right of access was suf-
ficiently important to warrant constitutional protection, 7 1 the Third Cir-
cuit carefully applied the first amendment analysis which the Supreme
Court first announced in the Richmond Newspapers72 plurality opinion and
later clarified in Globe Newspaper.7 3 In its application of this line of analy-
sis, the Third Circuit is to be commended for its specificity in articulat-
ing the procedural and substantive requirements which a trial court
must meet to justify limitation of the public's right.7 4 The Third Cir-
tries could have been decided on common law grounds alone. Id. For a discus-
sion of the court's common law holding, see supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text. It is noteworthy that the Third Circuit had previously based
a decision that the press had a right of access to video and audio tapes from a
criminal trial solely on common law grounds. See United States v. Criden (Criden
1), 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of Criden I, see supra note
31 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision to address the constitu-
tional issues, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra notes 3 & 6 and ac-
companying text. The basis for the first amendment protection guaranteed in
Richmond Newspapers, and followed by the Third Circuit, was the historical pre-
sumption of open judicial proceedings. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-73
(plurality opinion). This presumption convinced the Supreme Court that the
first amendment contained a guarantee that the public could assemble to listen
and observe what goes on in public places, such as courtrooms in order to pro-
tect "freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of gov-
ernment." Id. at 575 (plurality opinion). See generally Fenner & Koley, supra note
64, at 420-30 (comparing the seven opinions in Richmond Newspapers).
73. For a discussion of Globe Newspapers, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text. In Globe Newspaper, a five-Justice majority agreed that the first amendment
protects the public's right of access to criminal trials to ensure that the constitu-
tionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. 457
U.S. at 604-05. As in Richmond Newspapers, the Globe Newspaper Court emphasized
the importance of the long history of open judicial proceedings in interpreting
the first amendment protection. Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's ap-
plication of this line of reasoning, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of these requirements, see supra notes 48-49 and ac-
companying text. In comparison to the Third Circuit's specificity in describing
the requirements for denying the public's right, the Richmond Newspapers Court
provided little guidance for trial courts that are facing closure decisions. The
Richmond Newspapers plurality implied that the articulation of an "overriding in-
terest" in the findings might justify closure without clarifying what would consti-
tute such an overriding interest. 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion). See also
Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: A New But Uncertain "Right of Ac-
cess," 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 989, 1019 (1981) ("[u]ntil the Court adopts a specific
standard of closure, trial courts must rely upon some general guidelines set
forth in Richmond").
In subsequent extensions of Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the
courts have clarified the requirements for closure in a range ofjudicial proceed-
ings. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984)
(general assertion of defendant's fair trial rights and potential jurors' privacy
rights found not sufficiently specific to justify closure of voir dire examinations
prior to criminal trial); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d
658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983) (counsel's representation that trade secrets were in-
volved found sufficient to justify closure to consider issue of confidentiality
994 [Vol. 30: p. 980
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cuit's explication of these requirements will force trial courts to make
their closure decisions a matter of record for the purposes of public in-
spection and appellate review. 7 5 In cases where the requirements for
closure are not met, the only proceeding to which the public will be
denied access is the hearing on the issue of confidentiality, which subse-
quently will be available to the public through the transcript.
7 6
Although the Third Circuit carefully specified the requirements for
closure, it is submitted that the Publicker Industries facts did not require
full application of the substantive requirements. 7 7 The only counter-
vailing interest articulated by the trial court was Publicker's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of its subsidiary's improper business
practice. 78 The Third Circuit stated, however, that the courts would not
protect a poor business practice of this type. 79 As a result, when ad-
dressing the substantive requirements, the court could only balance the
public's right of access against Publicker's asserted right, which was
completely unprotected.8 0 Because there was no protectable interest to
balance against the public's right of access, it is suggested that Publicker
Industries makes the public's right of access appear stronger than subse-
quent courts will find it. For example, it is submitted that if the public's
right is weighed against a colorable claim for protection of a trade secret
or of a minor's right to privacy, the public's right would be out-
weighed. 8 ' It remains for future cases to define the relative weight of
where court knew details of trade secret involvement); United States v. Criden
(Criden I/), 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982) (posting of closure motions on docket,
consideration of alternatives to closure, and articulation of reasons for closure
required to justify closing pretrial suppression, due process and entrapment
hearings).
75. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive requirements, see
supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the required procedures for closure as applied to
the Publicker Industries facts, see supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the court's application of the substantive require-
ments to the Publicker Industries facts, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying
text.
78. For a discussion of the court's determination that the trial court had
articulated a countervailing interest only with regard to protecting Publicker's
"sensitive" information, see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the court's reasoning as to why Publicker's "sensi-
tive" information should not be protected, see supra notes 59-62 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the types of interests the courts will protect, see
supra notes 49 & 60 and accompanying text.
80. 733 F.2d at 1074. For a discussion of the substantive requirements
describing the required balancing of the public's right of access against the
state's or moving party's interest in maintaining confidentiality, see supra note 49
and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08. In Globe Vewspaper, the
Court indicated that where a court made specific findings to support a limited
closure decision, the state's interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor could be strong enough to outweigh the public's right of
access during the minor's testimony. Id. In such a case, it is submitted that the
1985] 995
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/13
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the public's right of access with respect to the various interests that the
courts will protect.8 2
As a result of the Publicker Industries decision, the news media may
exercise their right of access to civil proceedings with increased fre-
quency.83 Because the Third Circuit's requirements for closure are
strict, the press and public will gain increased access to information.8 4
It is submitted that in extending the protective umbrella of the first
amendment to guarantee the public a right of access to civil proceed-
ings, the Third Circuit has taken a significant step in the direction of
expanding the protection given to informed public debate under the
first amendment.8 5
Wendy L. Bell
public's right of access would, by comparison, appear less weighty than it does in
Publicker Industries. For a discussion of the types of interests which the courts are
willing to protect, see supra notes 49 & 60 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the substantive requirements which specify that the
public's right of access will be presumed and then balanced against an asserted
protectable interest, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
83. It is submitted that with an established right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings, publishers and reporters may be increasingly willing to assert this
right in order to gain access in cases in which the right would not previously
have appeared to be worth litigating.
84. For a discussion of the requirements for closure, see supra notes 48-49
and accompanying text.
85. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)
("debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open")).
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